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I am pleased that my article on the World Simulation
Process and the implications and potential applications of
computer-generated virtual reality (CGVR) has stimulated
thoughtful reflection, such as that expressed in Begelman's
letter. Technological progress in VR developmen~ has been
much faster than I anticipated in the article (Tart, 1990)
published only last year, so the sooner we think about poten-
tial uses and abuses of this major new technology, the bet-
ter.
Begelman raises issues in three main areas: (1) the philo-
sophical implications and bases of my paper; (2) applica-
bility of the World Simulation Process model to ordinary
people and patients; and (3) potential clinical applications
of CGVR. The philosophical issues seem to be Begelman's
main interest.
(1) With regard to the philosophical bases of my paper,
Begelman attributes an absolutist Kantian or identity theo-
rist position to me (saying "...he believes it.") that I do not
hold. To do this, he badly distorts what I actually said and
sets up a straw man in my place, for reasons unclear to me.
As the basis for his discussion, Begelman quotes from
my paper that:
The accepted modern understanding... indicates
that we do not experience the outer world directly,
but indirectly. (Tart, 1990, p. 227)
His ellipses leave out my immediate, parenthetical qualify-
ing statement about that modern understanding, namely:
"(which I think is actually incomplete in important ways, but
that is not germane to our discussion here - see [Tart,
1990a])." Perusal of the reference cited would have further
shown that I believe the "widely accepted psychoneural iden-
tity hypothesis" I noted is just that: widely accepted, both
explicitly and implicitly, in the scientific, psychological, and
psychiatric, if not the philosophical communities, but not
necessarily true.
It is fine with me if Begelman wants to discuss Kantian
views or the psychoneural identity hypothesis, but there is
no need to misrepresent my views of the issue in order to
do so. It is ironic, considering I suspect that my actual views
may be closer to Begelman's than those he attributes to me.
I did not elaborate on my position in the paper since I
felt it unnecessary to do so in a context that primarily stressed
potential investigative and clinical applications. For those
curious regarding my current position (subject to change,
ofcourse, if new data come in), it is that an empirically testable
dualism makes the most sense of our total, contemporary
knowledge about the functioning of the mind. I believe that
the psychoneural identity hypothesis is useful but seriously
limited in its applicability, because itcannotaccountfor impor-
tant, empirically observable facts. That is, consciousness, as
we ordinarily experience it, involves a systems emergent, a qual-
itatively unique outcome of the interaction of both a "non-
physical" somethingwhich words like "mind" or "spirit" grop-
ingly refer to, intensively interacting with the physical,
electrochemical processes of body, brain, and nervous sys-
tem. The interested reader can see the Tart, 1990a refer-
ence for a formal exposition of this approach. Computer-
generated VR is a useful model (not a well-articulated theory
yet) for this interactive dualism approach, for the interac-
tive combination of person (analogous to mind) interacting
with CGVR (analogous to body, brain, and nervous system)
shows emergent properties and has experiences not obvi-
ous from knowledge of either system alone.
(2) With regard to the use ofthe World Simulation Process
model for ordinary persons and patients: certainly we are in
relatively good touch with many aspects of everyday physi-
cal reality the vast majority of the time. Otherwise, we should
all be run over by cars or otherwise dead. But as any good
observer of humans, as well as clinicians, can see, individu-
als can have beliefs about the world and others in it that may
be markedly at variance with the "common sense" or phys-
ically instrumented view of what is happening. Not that the
common sense view is always accurate, of course. Further,
numerous psychological studies have shown in detail that
we often do not experience the world as having certain char-
acteristics which we then consciously and deliberately inter-
pret in the light of conscious belief systems. Rather, we see,
we automatically perceive the world as corresponding to our
(often implicit) belief systems. Any introductory psycholo-
gy text will provide numerous illustrations of this, in other
sensory modalities as well as the visual one.
Many paranoids (and we "normals"), for example, will,
at least some of the time, "see" suspicious facial expressions
of others or the like, expressions involving perceived "phys-
ical" components that a camera would not show. The World
Simulation Process approach, with its CGVRanalog, is a novel
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and stimulatingway ofconceptualizing how automated, usu-
ally unconscious interpretive processes often intervene
between the physical stimulation of sensory receptors and
the final conscious experience. As Begelman quotes me,
"Although these neural events... " (at the receptors) "are ini-
tially related to external world events, this relationship may
be greatly altered by the time we deal with the final neural
events comprising consciousness" (Tart, 1990b, p. 227).
Thus much thatis,taken as simple "perception" is indeed
construction and interpretation of the neural signals origi-
nating at sensory receptors, mistakenly experienced as an
automatic, seamless process of apparent simple perception
of the physical world. It is an important, indeed vital, task
ofphilosophy, psychology, psychotherapy, personal growth,
and some meditative disciplines to break down this autom-
atized process, so we can observe the differences between
what we actually sense of the physical world around us (with-
in the physical limits of our receptors) and the automatized
interpretations presented as apparent simple perceptions
that we normally experience. This is the practical and clin-
ical application ofthe World Simulation Process approach,
regardless ofits ultimate philosophical assumptions or impli-
cations.
(3) As to potential applications of CGVR, my first exam-
ple with a paranoid patient was intended to be provocative,
as CGVR will be a very powerful technology which, if misap-
plied, could indeed worsen psychopathology. Further, I am
not a practicing psychotherapist myself, so I hope to stimu-
late skilled clinicians to propose dozens of ways to use the
CGVR technology more usefully and effectively than those I
suggested.
As to the accuracy of any CGVR simulation of a person's
experienced reality, Begelman misses an important point of
my paper, although he quotes my question, "Can you now
understandyour client's reality better?"An individual patient,
whether paranoid or suffering from many other kinds of
psychopathology, who is reasonably cooperative and intel-
ligent, could tell the therapist, "No, your idea of my expe-
rience in CGVR is all wrong, you don't understand me!" and
then go on to the more important step of suggesting just
how the CGVR simulation could be reprogrammed until a
good experiential fit is obtained. Then we will have a ther-
apist and/or researcher who will have a better understand-
ing of the individual clients' experiential world.•
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